Do rules keep track workers safe?

The Initiate possession protection initiative is an excellent example of the need to consider an activity’s overall process to determine how it can best be managed both safely and efficiently.

Prior to retiring in 2009, I was involved with various possession management initiatives when it became apparent that work in possessions had not been considered in this way. As a result, some of the rules were confusing and did not address the practicalities of engineering work. After I retired, the title of this article was the subject of a presentation that I gave to a conference of the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH). Readers are invited to judge for themselves whether this title was unreasonably provocative.

Possession rules

Rules associated with the safety of railway engineering work are specified in Rule Book handbooks. Any work that requires the use of engineering trains or On Track Plant (OTP) requires a possession of the line to be taken under the control of the Person In Charge of the Possession (PICOP). The PICOP’s role is specified in Rule Book Handbook No 11 (HB11).

Essentially, this is to ensure that the possession is protected from train movements and that the open line is protected from movements leaving the possession. In addition, he/she must ensure the train and OTP movements outside of worksites within the possession.

To enable work to take place, the PICOP authorises one or more Engineering Supervisors (ES) to set up a worksite(s) within the possession. The ES is not necessarily an engineer, nor a supervisor of work. As specified in HB12, the ES’s role is to control train/OTP movements and authorise Controllers of Site Safety (COSS) to set up their site(s) of work in the possession worksite as specified in HB9.

The COSS does not necessarily supervise the actual work. Their role may be limited to ensuring that the workgroup is protected from train movements and, if required, by isolation of Overhead Line Equipment (OLE). The Safe System of Work (SSOW) that they set up only relates to train/OTP movements and does not consider risk from the actual work. These are managed by a work supervisor who must have the required expertise. It is often not practical to provide such individuals with the full COSS competency.

When it is necessary to work under isolated overhead lines, the COSS must be in possession of an overhead line permit and brief the workgroup about its conditions before work can start.

HB15 specifies how OTP movements are controlled by Machine Controllers (MC) who must get authority from the PICOP or ES for on or off tracking and movements in the areas under their control.

Site of work

The site of work is where all engineering work is undertaken once protected by train/OTP movements by the SSOW set up by the COSS. This is not the same as the worksite which is the line(s) in the possession over which the ES has control of train movements. Lack of understanding of the distinction between the terms ‘site of work’ and ‘worksite’ has caused much confusion.

This is not helped by the Rule Book possession handbooks’ definition of a worksite which is “the portion of line within a possession of a running line where work will take place”. This is misleading as often work is only done in a small part of the worksite. For example, a typical worksite may be the length of track between an access point, where OTP is on-tracked, and the site of work. Given the distance between access points, it is not untypical for worksites to be a few kilometres long, while the site of work may be around 100 metres long.

As shown below, a more meaningful definition would be “the portion of the line in which sites of work are established”. Despite possession work being done within sites of work, this term is not defined in any of the Rule Book possession handbooks, nor are sites of work shown in any of the diagrams with the Rule Book handbooks.

HB12 requires the COSS and ES to agree the limits of the site of work. However, there is no guidance on how this should be done nor any requirement to demarcate it.

Within the site of work, OTP movements must generally be done at less than 5mph. Yet HB15 which concerns OTP movement does not mention sites of work. Moreover, HB15 does not give the COSS any authority to control OTP movements even though they are responsible for protecting their group from train movements. Instead, HB15 requires that, within a worksite, the ES must authorise all OTP movements. Often, the number of OTP movements are such that it is not possible to comply with this rule.

Rochford OTP collision

In January 2020, a Mobile Elevating Work Platform (MEWP) collided with another stationary MEWP within a possession at Rochford. The investigation by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) identified various causal factors, one of which was confusion among staff about who was in charge of the safe movement of on-track plant.

In addition to the relevant Rule Book handbooks, the Mechanical and Electrical Engineers’ networking group has produced document M&EE – COP0001, a code of practice for the management of competence of plant operators. There is also a Network Rail standard NR/L2/RMVP/0200 ‘Infrastructure Plant Manual’. This defines the requirements and guidance for the use of OTP on Network Rail’s infrastructure.

Module P521 of this manual, the ‘Plant operations scheme’ includes the requirement for a Plant Operations Scheme (POS) representative to be on site. This is an additional role not mentioned in Rule Book possession handbooks. This illustrates how those on site must comply both with Rule Book Handbooks and the applicable Network Rail standards.

The RAIB report into the Rochford incident found that the COSS, who was also acting as MC, incorrectly believed that the POS was in charge of OTP movements. It concluded that due to the number of supervisory roles on site (COSS/MC, POS, and site supervisors) the COSS/MC and other staff were confused and lacked confidence in their role.

RAIB also asked RSSB about the impractical rule that only an ES can authorise an OTP movement within the work site (HB12 6.1 and HB 15 7.1). This was an issue mentioned in my 2010 presentation. The RSSB view was that this rule only applies to OTP movements to and from the site of work. Whilst this is a reasonable requirement, it is not what the rule states. Furthermore, ‘site of work’ is not mentioned in HB15 about OTP movements. Four years later, this rule has yet to be updated to reflect RSSB’s interpretation of it and so still includes a rule that cannot always be complied with.

RAIB’s Rochford report (08/2020) recommended that Network Rail review and clarify the roles and responsibilities of staff working in possessions and work sites to avoid duplication of responsibilities and confusion arising between roles. Although this recommendation was made in September 2020, RAIB’s website shows that it has yet to be closed out. It is difficult to see how Network Rail alone can close out this recommendation as changes to Rule Book handbooks are authorised by RSSB.

Fifteen years ago

As well as the complexity of possession communications, my presentation to IOSH 15 years ago also considered the following issues:

Speed of movements in worksites. In 2009, it was generally considered that OTP could only move at walking pace in worksites although this was only required within the COSS’s site of work. Hence it was not unusual for an MC to walk with their OTP for the few kilometres between access point and site of work. Now the requirement is more realistic as HB15 allows movements at speeds of up to 25mph when authorised by the ES or PICOP.

Such movements are undertaken subject to defined send and receive arrangements or OTP being approved to carry the MC. HB15 specifies when movements are restricted to a maximum of 5mph. It implies, but does not mention, that this restriction is applicable to the site of work.

Need for an ‘all lines blocked’ COSS competency. Setting up an SSOW in an all-lines blocked worksite is relatively straightforward as this only requires the COSS to agree worksite limits with the ES and obtain his/her authority to start work. Yet the only person who can do this is a COSS who has attended a week-long training course to learn how to set up different SSOWs on or adjacent to open lines as well as those within possession worksites.

As a result, it is not practicable for all those supervising the work to have a COSS competency. This, and the provision of an all-lines blocked COSS competency, would simplify communications by largely removing the need for a workgroup to have both a COSS and site supervisor.

COSSes losing open-line competencies. As many COSSes rarely work outside possessions there is a risk that they may lose their competence to set up a SSOW outside a possession should they be required to do so. This risk has increased as Network Rail has specified that, from 31 March, all MCs must have a COSS competency.

Facilities for possession management. RAIB’s report into a serious possession irregularity at Balham in 2019 recommended that “Network Rail should review its requirements for locations in which PICOPs are permitted to carry out their duties, so that they have adequate facilities, information, and equipment to enable them to control train movements associated with possessions.”

Though this recommendation has yet to be closed out, there are many examples of good practice to manage complex possessions such as the use of magnetic white boards. The Transpennine Route Upgrade uses the eviFile digital possession management system as well as C&G checkpoint which enables an ES to simultaneously authorise all COSSes in the worksite to set up their SSOWs. Network Rail Wales and Western are using PodFlow to improve the safety and efficiency of communications between PICOPs, ESs, and COSSes.

Situational awareness. Fifteen years ago, personnel being in the wrong location was a frequent cause of possession irregularities. At the time, staff were given little information on how to get to the required access point. Much use is now made of Geographic Information Systems to find and visualise track locations. This includes the provision of an Access Point App for Apple and Google devices which enables users to easily find the location of Network Rail’s 18,000+ access points.

Network Rail is also keen to expand the use of geofencing technology from companies such as Onwave and Tended to ensure that track workers are where they should be. This also enables the ‘site of work’ to be virtually demarcated. Despite such innovations, I am advised that personnel being in the wrong location remains a significant issue and wonder whether there is adequate training on how personnel must use such new techniques to confirm their location.

The above shows that, although the process of managing possessions has improved, some issues remain and, as RAIB has identified, the roles and responsibilities of staff working in possessions need to be clarified.

Producing the rules

In 2001, Lord Cullen’s report into the fatal Ladbroke Grove crash recommended that railway group standards should be produced by an independent body. This resulted in the creation of RSSB which manages the production of railway standards which include National Operating Publications (NOP) such as the Rule Book, the content of which is managed by RSSB’s Traffic Operation and Management Standards Committee (TOMSC) which has 15 members of whom three are from Network Rail and two are infrastructure contractors.

The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (ROGS) require train and infrastructure operators to have a safety management system (SMS) which includes procedures to comply national safety rules which include NOPs. However, as the ORR’s guidance to the ROGS regulations makes clear, the requirement for an SMS as specified by ROGS does not apply to work in engineering possessions.

Within an engineering possession all activities are done either by Network Rail personnel or those under contract to the company. Hence, unlike interworking on the open railway, Network Rail has the legal responsibity for everything done in possessions. It would thus seem reasonable for the company to have direct control over the rules for the work in possessions for which it is accountable.

Since British Rail days, possession rules have evolved over many years and been specified by operations rules committees. The basic framework for possession rules is the control of engineering trains by PICOP and ES for which the site of work need not be considered. However, from the 1990s there was increased use of road-rail OTP which entered the possession sideways by being on-tracked at an access point. Furthermore, much more work was being done in possessions from this time. This resulted in complex possessions with many sites of work and large numbers of OTP movements. The practicalities of managing such possessions are not fully addressed by the Rule Book handbooks.

Hence Network Rail produces its own standards in addition to the Rule Book requirements. For example, the requirement for a POS representative which is a role not mentioned in the Rule Book. This lack of a cohesive approach from having two different organisations producing possession rules and standards would seem to be the root cause of the confusion that RAIB has identified.

The perceived need to have possession rules to support Fundamental Operating Principles (FOPs) also has the potential to add complexity. For possessions, the most relevant are ‘Trains proceeding over any portion of line must not be obstructed in a way that threatens their safety’ (FOP3) and ‘People must be kept at a safe distance from moving trains’ (FOP8).

Yet work in possessions is pre-planned by competent personnel who understand the risks associated with these FOPs. RSSB defines rules as “direct instructions to railway staff” which implies real-time situations. It is thus not appropriate to apply such rules when planning complex work.

Little has changed

As it is over 15 years since I was on site as a Network Rail employee, I am conscious that my practical experience of possession management is dated. Hence, I sought feedback from those working for Network Rail and its suppliers before finalising this article.

The feedback I received was that this article is “spot on” and highlights very real issues. I was also advised that the introduction of additional roles such as the POS representative, and the “fleeting introduction of the Planning and Delivering Safe Work (PDSW) initiative which gave us the Safe Work Leader (SWL) competencies”, ultimately cause much more confusion.

Such feedback reinforces the conclusion of my 2009 presentation that Network Rail, as the responsible employer, should take ownership of track safety at director level to ensure a cohesive approach to rules and other risk controls. This requires Network Rail to have direct control of the possession safety rules.

In 2010, my presentation answered the question it posed as follows: “Yes, possession rules do control the risk to track workers. However, some are presented in a confusing manner, and some issues are not addressed. Furthermore, rules must not be considered in isolation from other risk control measures.”

This statement remains as true today as it was 15 years ago.

This feature was shared with RSSB prior to its publication. In response, RSSB wished to emphasise that Standards Committees are made up of members who represent a cross-section of industry stakeholders. Standards Committees decide whether to approve changes to rules and standards by consensus, and according to the decision criteria set out in the industry-agreed Railway Standards Code. RSSB then authorises the change, provided it is satisfied that due process has been followed.  

RSSB also advised that there are several projects currently underway to update rules for track worker safety and possession management, based on ideas proposed by Network Rail. RSSB works closely with Network Rail, infrastructure contractors, and train operators to gather feedback on how the rules are working in practice, discuss proposals for change and take them forward.

Image credit: Network Rail