Braskem is using Rockwell Automation’s SecureOT platform across more than 39 industrial facilities to consolidate information about equipment connected to its production networks. During the first eight months of the deployment, Rockwell reports that more than 3,000 operational technology assets were mapped and catalogued. The chemical producer is using the resulting inventory to help determine which security weaknesses require attention and to assemble evidence for internal and external compliance reviews.
A large process plant can contain programmable logic controllers, operator interfaces, engineering workstations, network equipment and specialist instruments installed over many years. They may come from different vendors, use distinct communications protocols and operate on maintenance schedules that cannot simply follow corporate computer patching cycles. When asset lists are incomplete, security teams have difficulty linking a software vulnerability to the physical process or determining who is authorised to change the affected system.
Rockwell describes SecureOT as a vendor-neutral asset inventory and vulnerability management platform. Its published capabilities include device profiling, technical configuration records and contextual information about how assets fit within industrial networks. Connecting an asset to its operational role gives security teams a more useful basis for scheduling mitigations than treating every identical vulnerability score as an identical production risk. The deployment covers several industrial environments, without a breakdown for each plant of the network architecture.
Deployment now extends across more than 39 global facilities, although Rockwell gives no single figure for the total number of devices connected at those sites. Rockwell records more than 3,000 assets catalogued and separately describes Braskem as operating 39 industrial units. The source does not explain whether those terms count physical sites and operating units differently. The inventoried total is likewise not stated to encompass every control device at every facility, so it should be read as the programme’s recorded asset count.
Rockwell also reports full project preparation and 95% infrastructure readiness during the first eight months. Those figures describe implementation progress, not the proportion of assets that are free of vulnerabilities or the outcome of a penetration test. Neither an independent certification result nor a measured reduction in cyber incidents was published with the deployment figures. The more substantial established result is the creation of a shared inventory spanning a geographically dispersed process industry operation.
SecureOT’s product documentation describes software discovery and sensors that can observe industrial network segments, combined with asset profiles and collection methods designed for operational environments. Depending on configuration, inventory records can hold information about firmware, software versions, interfaces and network communication. Rockwell has not specified which of those discovery methods is used at each Braskem site. It would therefore be inaccurate to infer a uniform sensor arrangement or identical network segmentation across the whole manufacturing network.
Process equipment cannot always be taken offline when a new vulnerability appears. A controller responsible for a feed valve or safety-related sequence may have a narrow maintenance window, while a supervisory workstation can interact continuously with production data and alarms. Security changes need to be evaluated against operating procedures, equipment compatibility and the plant’s change management process. Recognising an exposed version of software is the beginning of that assessment rather than an instruction to patch immediately.
The inventory gives risk teams a way to compare a device’s technical exposure with its role in the production system. Network access restrictions or segmentation may reduce the routes through which an attacker could reach an asset; the consequences of losing a particular process controller may meanwhile be higher than those of losing an office computer. Mitigation can involve access control, additional monitoring, maintenance planning or a tested software change, and the balance must be assessed against process availability and safety requirements.
Braskem’s industrial network spans chemical production operations in several countries, making local records and common reporting methods important. An inventory that captures equipment ownership, software information and the reasons for outstanding vulnerabilities can support audit preparation and make handovers between operations and security personnel more consistent. Rockwell says Braskem is using the platform to improve that process, but has not identified a new certification awarded as a result of the rollout.
The supplier’s wider industrial cybersecurity offering includes managed detection and security services as well as inventory and vulnerability functions. Those services should not automatically be treated as part of every Braskem deployment: the source does not enumerate contracted services by facility. The distinction matters in process environments because detecting unusual traffic, approving a mitigation and changing an operating controller are different tasks, often assigned to different teams with different authorities.
As new production equipment is commissioned, modified or retired, Braskem will need to keep the inventory current and connect its records to vulnerability reviews and maintenance decisions. The reported number of catalogued devices establishes an initial operational baseline across the manufacturing network. Consistent measures at individual sites of coverage and corrective action handling would then show how reliably that shared inventory supports the company’s ongoing security work.
